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THE ELIMINATION OF THE NONCONFORMING USE
IN CALIFORNIA
By ELVIN LAWSON RIDDLE
Mr. "X" has been operator of a scrap metal salvage enterprise for
fifteen years. He has invested extensively in equipment and buildings and
has given faithful service to his customers in nearby Orange City, Cali-
fornia. Five years ago the orange groves surrounding his location were
"bull dozed," tract houses thrown up, and Mr. "X" found his property
incorporated as part of Orange City. On that day he also became the vio-
lator of City Ordinance 23456 which prohibited all but residential use
of the one-unit structures allowed in the zone his buildings occupied. For
five years the Planning Commission of Orange City has avoided enforcing
this ordinance against Mr. "X." An enforcement of Ordinance 23456
would compel "X" to discontinue his trade and with it his means of
livelihood. Forcing "X" to sell his peculiarly constructed buildings and
lot for residential use would provide poor compensation. Attempting a
move of his heavy stock and equipment out of town would cost him
nearly as much as his business is worth. But continuing his necessarily
noisy operations in this residential zone has in the past and will in the
future continue to seriously interfere with the home lives of the many
nearby residents. The experience of other communities indicates that elimi-
nation of Mr. "X's" business is not likely to occur through obsolence,
fire, or other ravages of time. The Illinois Municipal Review' states:
"[T] hey not merely continue to exist, but to send down deeper roots. They
become clear monopolies with special privileges. Their existence is a con-
tinual threat to the conservation of property values in the districts where
they exist .... "2
The ordinance that prevents certain uses insulates "X" from his natural
competitors. He is granted a virtual franchise in his community. The
elimination of the situation that Mr. "X" represents has been the recurring
problem of community planners throughout the United States.
In zoning terminology, "X" is a nonconforming user-his building
or land is occupied by a use that does not comply with the regulations of
the district in which it is situated.3 In seeking to eliminate the noncon-
forming use we are confronted with the conflicting interests of the indi-
vidual and his property against the police power of the state. The United
States Constitution acts as final arbiter between these interests by pro-
tecting the property rights of the individual and leaving the states adequate
police power to promote the public welfare. But this residual power as
stated in Miller v. Bd. of Public Works:4
' Bartholomew, The Zoning of Illinois Municipalities, 17 ILL. MuNIc. Rav. 221.
2 Id. at 232.
3 Note, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 477, 486 (1941).
4 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 Pac. 381, 383 (1925).
(64]
"[1]s not confined within the narrow circumspection of precedents, resting
on past conditions; ... as a commonwealth develops politically, economi-
cally, and socially, the police power likewise develops, within reason, to
meet the changed and changing conditions .... -5
California's rapid growth has magnified the conflict between police power
and private property. Consequently its use of police power has had to be
especially progressive to promote the welfare of the public and at the
same time protect the property rights of the individual.
The regulations aimed at eliminating the non-conforming use are of
two general types: (1) limitations on the height or bulk of buildings within
certain designated districts, having to do with structural and architec-
tural designs, and (2) limitations on the use to which buildings within cer-
tain designated districts may be put. This Article will discuss the more
important regulatory schemes employed to effect these limitations, to-
gether with the applicable common law principles, and the social, economic
and political factors influencing such regulations.
Presunmption of Statutory Validity:
The validity of zoning has been demonstrated so thoroughly that the
constitutionality of the general principle is no longer open to question,
but certain applications of that principal are still questioned under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. The elimination of nonconforming uses has been
one of these frequently questioned applications.
The zoning ordinances used in non-conforming use situations are
tested on two bases: (1) Their end must be to satisfy a public need
sufficiently strong to justify an individual's sacrifice of property, and (2)
the means employed must be reasonable. But as is stated in Ex-Parte
Quong Wo,0 the courts do not feel free to scrutinize zoning measures too
closely:
"It is, of course, primarily for the legislative body cloaked with this power
to determine when such regulations are essential, and its determination in
this regard in view of its better knowledge of all the circumstances and the
presumption that it is acting with a due regard for the rights of all parties,
will not be disturbed in the courts, unless it can plainly be seen that the
regulation has no relation to the ends stated .... '"7 (Emphasis added.)
Only a clear showing of disregard for the property rights of individuals will
rebut the presumption of validity enjoyed by these ordinances.
It is generally held that even if a particular owner has successfully
rebutted this presumption of validity, his success may not help other non-
conforming users. Other types of statutes or ordinances found to be
5 Ibid.
O 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911)
7 Id. at 230, 118 Pac. at 718.
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violating the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitu-
tion are usually invalid for all applications. But a zoning ordinance may
be void to some and valid to all other property owners-whether a zoning
ordinance is unreasonable as to the particular property involved decides
its validity.' Each property owner must take the time, expense, and effort
of having his particular problem decided in court by a writ of certiorari or
mandamus.' This tedious prospect has had a strong deterring effect on
challengers of zoning ordinances.
Because the ordinance that has a retroactive effect on vested property
rights of the nonconforming user may be held unconstitutional, most ordi-
nances specifically exclude such non-conforming users. But a failure to
make such an exception is seldom held invalid on a constitutional basis.
The explanation is that the practice of exceptions is so generally accepted
in ordinances that have a retroactive effect that the nonconforming uses
are presumed to be excepted anyway.' °
The California Government Code" attempts to provide an added pro-
cedural protection for the nonconforming user. Local adjustment boards
of the various planning commissions are required to be created for the con-
sideration, upon application, of variances from the terms of the ordinances.
The adversely affected owner may bring his problem to this board and seek
an exception from the operation of the ordinance. The board then considers
the amount of hardship suffered in particular cases and gives relief where
the situation warrants. It should be mentioned that these boards are usually
composed of members of the planning commission which drafted the or-
dinance. Such a board may show little friendliness toward granting the
exceptions that preserve the nonconforming uses and thereby thwart
their work toward comprehensive planning. The disgruntled holder of an
adverse decision from the board must then appeal by writ of certiorari or
mandamus to a court of law. But his prospect for relief there is poor. The
courts consider but two issues: (1) whether the person affected has been
granted a hearing, and if so, (2) whether there is evidence to support
the board's findings. If there is room for any reasonable difference of
opinion, the board's decision stands. 2 Thus, as will be indicated later,
such boards may in fact provide little protection for the nonconforming
user.
Early Development of Planning: Public Nuisance
In the early days of community planning before our present day
liberal application of police powers the basis for eliminating nonconform-
ing users was founded on the theory of abating public nuisances. Besides
serving as a direct means of abating a particular use, the public nuisance
8 Morris v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 856, 254 P.2d 935 (1953).
9 Grief v. Dullea, 66 Cal. App. 2d 986, 153 P.2d 581 (1924).
10 See note 8 supra.
1 CAL. GovT. CODE § 65850.
12 Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1947).
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principal provided the authority for upholding the early zoning ordinances.
A public nuisance has been defined as:
"[0] ne which affects an indefinite number of persons, or all the residents
of a particular locality, or all people coming within the extent of its range
or operation, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal.13
Since a public nuisance is illegal, its elimination by use of the police
power is not unreasonable and does not violate due process.
The effectiveness of the public nuisance tool for the abatement of
nonconforming uses has varied with the ingenuity and inclination of the
courts and legislatures. Early California courts upheld retroactive zoning
laws only on finding that the target of the ordinance in question was a
nuisance per se. This has been defined as:
"[O]ne which constitutes a nuisance at all times and under all circum-
stances, irrespective of locality or surroundings, as,... distinguished from
things declared to be nuisances by statute, and also from things which con-
stitute nuisances only when considered with reference to their particular
location or other individual circumstances."' 14
The United States Supreme Court in Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles"
was unable to find a nuisance per se that justified a 1903 ordinance pro-
hibiting gas works within the city limits. This view was supported by
In Re Kelso,' where the court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance
prohibiting the quarrying of rock within the city limits.. In these two
cases the courts felt a gas works or a rock quarry could be operated in a
populous area so long as no tangible harm had been shown.
This attitude in a growing urban community quickly became untenable,
and it soon became necessary to the public's welfare that consideration
be given to particular locations and other individual circumstances. By
1911, another Los Angeles ordinance was passed and approved prohibiting
within residential areas any stone-crusher, rolling mill, carpet-beating
establishment, hay barn, wood yard, lumber .yard, public laundry, or
wash house.17 Then in Ex parte Hadaclzeck,1' the Calif. Supreme Court
approved a statute prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within the city
limits of Los Angeles, even though its enforcement deprived the owner of
a valuable business without compensation. This decision was sustained
by the United States Supreme Court in Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles,'9
where the Court said that the police power could be exerted to declare that
under particular circumstances, and in particular localities, specified
1 3 BrACK, LAw DicnoNARY (3rd ed. 1933).
14 Ibid.
15 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
16147 Cal. 609, 82 Pac. 241 (1905).17 See note 6 supra.
18 165 CaL 416, 132 Pac. 584 (1913).
19 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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businesses which are not nuisances per se are to be deemed nuisances in
fact and at law. By means of having the planning board composed of the
same people who drafted the ordinances substantial progress was made
towards comprehensive planning.
The early rule requiring a finding of a nuisance per se had impeded the
elimination of nonconforming uses. However, the adoption of the liberal
statutory nuisance system furnished an effective tool for accomplishing
the desired result.
But an even more important step was taken in Livingston Rock Co.
v. City of Los Angeles2" (1954). There it was decided that a local planning
commission could decide which uses were nuisances at law. The statute
involved provided the commission with quasi judicial authority for deter-
mining in particular instances which owners were conducting their opera-
tions so as to constitute nuisances at law. The main advantage in having
a commission make these decisions is that they may make a conclusive
finding of nuisance far more easily than a court of equity with its tradi-
tional requirements. Or equity may prevent a complete abatement of a
nonconforming use through its modification, whereas the owner who re-
ceives an adverse decision from a board must accept the decision or appeal
to the courts. There he would be met by a presumption favoring the finding
of the local board."
Thus the courts in recognizing the urgent need for community planning
in a modern society have effectively "stacked the deck" of procedural law
against the nonconforming user. This owner must seek relief from a review-
ing commission which by its nature and composition will quite likely be
unsympathetic to his position. Failing there, he must appeal the com-
mission's findings to a court where a presumption favors such findings.
Or he can go directly to the courts and attack the validity of an ordinance
which the courts will initially presume to be valid.
Further Development of Planning Regulations Under More
Liberal Police Powers
Even the rule regarding nuisances at law requires a use to be causing
a present harm to the public before there can be a basis for its elimination.
Our Mr. "X" caused little discomfort to the orange growers around his
scrap yard, but he might well have discouraged future home buyers from
settling in his vicinity. If zoning is to be most effective its purpose should
be to provide for the future, and not to attempt to correct the mistakes
of the past. It seems to this writer that only legislation for prospective
purposes could insure the future welfare of the public. The modern con-
cept of the legislature's power to provide for the public welfare was indi-
20 43 Cal.2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954).
21 Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949).
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cated by the United States Supreme Court in Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Illinois:,°
"As our civic life has developed so has the definition of public welfare until
it has been held to embrace regulations ... to promote the economic wel-
fare, public convenience, and general prosperity of the community .... ,23
The court followed this concept of public welfare in its first decision
approving the validity of zoning ordinances, Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co.'
California was among the first to realize the advisability of zoning
measures to promote the public welfare. The promotion of the public
welfare was a sufficient justification for ordinances prohibiting the activi-
ties indicated in the following cases without the showing of nuisance: four
unit apartment houses in two unit zones,25 the drilling of new oil wells in
present fields within the city limits, 6 the continued existence of a cement
batching plant in a light industry zone,2 7 and the selling of residential lots
of a size below a prescribed minimum area 8
To satisfy due process the courts continued to require a showing of
some public benefit, if only a future one, as justification for the use of
legislative police power. Ordinances prohibiting an owner from erecting
an apartment house on his lot in an apartment house neighborhood,29 or
forbidding the operation of a lumber yard adjoining railroad tracks in an
industrial area,30 were not felt to be promotions of the public welfare.
To be held valid, an ordinance must show more than a legitimate end
of public welfare. There must be a use of reasonable means'to accomplish
that end. A means which imposes undue hardship on an individual owner
is not considered reasonable. In Jones v. City of Los Angeles,3' an or-
dinance was passed prohibiting the establishment of hospitals for the
treatment of mental disorders. Before it was passed the appellant had
constructed a building for use as a sanitarium. The court found that busi-
nesses of that type were proper subjects for such regulation and that the
classification of districts was reasonable and not arbitrary; but it refused
to enforce the ordinance because its retroactive effect, causing great injury
to a business which was not a public nuisance, made it an unreasonable
exercise of the police power as applied to the appellant. 2 So, despite the
present success in restraining the future uses of property, the public wel-
2200 U.S. 561 (1905).2 3 Id. at 606.
24272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25 See note 4 supra.
20 Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal2d 552, 254 P.2d 865 (1951).
27 See note 20 supra.
28 Clemmons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950).
2 9 Miler v. Bd. of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 Pac. 381, 383 (1925).
3 0 Hurst v. Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929).
81211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
3 2 Skalko v. Sunnyvale, 14 Cal2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939); Orange County v. Goldring,
121 Cal.App.2d 442, 263 P.2d 321 (1933); Ryan v. Andriano, 91 Cal.App. 136, 266 Pac. 831
(1928).
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fare cannot be promoted at the unreasonable expense of a nonconforming
user with vested rights at the effective date of the ordinance.
Restrictions Imposed on Expansions of Nonconforming Users
Even where a nonconforming use could not be eliminated, it could be
restrained. An immediate and complete elimination of the property of the
nonconforming user was considered too high a price for him to have to
pay for the promotion of the public welfare. But a regulation and re-
striction of his rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed as a property
owner was considered reasonable. The clearer the showing of a public
need for limitation on his use, the greater could be the restraint of the
individual's rights.
The first restriction imposed on a nonconforming user was the require-
ment that he be, in fact, a user at the time of the ordinance. This meant
that a lessee of proven oil lands who contemplated drilling for the oil in
the future was not a present user3 3 But an owner who had laid a founda-
tion and let contracts for the erection of a nonconforming building could
complete that building. 4 In the mind of the court, a contemplated drilling
was a lesser vested interest than a partially erected building. There was
accordingly less hardship in the former case.
While an existing nonconforming use was preserved, it was not allowed
to expand. A grocery store could not be extended twenty-two feet into a
vacant lot; 35 a statute limited the reconstruction of all nonconforming
structures to 25% of assessed value;" another grocery store could not be
built to replace the one destroyed by fire;37 a real estate office could not be
subsequently used after once having been discontinued.3
A distinction was usually made between nonconforming uses and
nonconforming structures. Nonconforming structures represent a greater
investment by the individual, and limitations on their use were accordingly
less stringent. The nonconforming uses which received the most attention
from the courts were those involving the drilling of oil wells in residential
areas. The typical statute prohibited the drilling of new wells in proven
oil lands, the deepening of existing wells, and the enlargement of storage
facilities.39 At the least, the nonconforming users were prevented from
enjoying many of the benefits which they had earlier by way of unintended
protection from zoning ordinances. At the most, the limitations put on
the uses assured their eventual elimination.
33 Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Fed.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1929).
34 County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal.2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1951).
35 Rehfield v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P.2d 419 (1933).
36 Yuba City v. Cherniavsky, 117 Cal. App. 568, 4 P.2d 299 (1931).
37 Ibid.
38 Burke v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.App.2d 189, 156 P.2d 28 (1945).
39 Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 Pac. 538 (1925); see
note 29 supra; Skalko v. Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 913 P.2d 93 (1939).
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Amortization of the Nonconforming Use
But as the need for comprehensive planning increased, so did the
realization that the nonconforming use must be totally eliminated. More
positive steps appeared to be needed. In the Zoning Bulletin of the Re-
gional Planning Association, June, 1952,40 it was said:
"The only positive method of getting rid of nonconforming uses yet de-
vised is to amortize a nonconforming building. That is, to determine the
normal useful remaining life of the building and prohibit the owner from
maintaining it after the expiration of that time."41
A gradual, rather than an immediate removal of the nonconforming use
through an amortization scheme was not thought to be so harsh as to be
unreasonable. Thus the complete elimination of the nonconforming use
could be realized by reasonable means.
The constitutionality of amortization statutes was early litigated in
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald,' a Louisiana case in which
certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. The Louisiana
court approved certain statutory provisions for the elimination of a grocery
store within one year. The court cited The Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co. in which the United States Supreme Court had said that the
Village had the authority to create and maintain a purely residential
district. The Louisiana Court then reasoned that the Village was vested
with authority to remove any business from the district and to fix a time
limit in which the same should be done. After this decision, many other
states utilized this technique and passed similar statutes which their courts
approved. Amortization statutes were passed in Chicago, Cleveland, New
Orleans, Richmond, Seattle, Tallahassee, and Wichita.
43
The apparently anomalous conclusion is that the courts have con-
doned the postponed elimination of the same property interests which they
protected from sudden elimination. But there is a reasonable basis for
this distinction. The owner suffers far less hardship through amortiza-
tion. He is given valuable time within which to more advantageously alter,
move, or discontinue his business. During this time an increase in his
proceeds through his new monopolistic position given him by the statute
may very likely compensate him for his loss caused by the statute.
Within the last ten years California has joined the other states in adopt-
ing amortization statutes. A typical California statute was the one ap-
proved by the court in City of Los Angeles v. Gage providing:
"... (a) The nonconforming uses of a conforming building or structure
may be continued, except that in the 'R' Zones any nonconforming corn-
40 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 CalApp.2d 442, 274 Pad 34 (1954).
41 Id. at 4S4, 274 Pac. at 41.
4 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929).
43 See note 40 supra.
44Ibid.
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mercial or industrial use of a residential building... shall be discontinued
within five (5) years ... (1) where no buildings are employed, (2) where
only buildings used are accessory or incidental to such uses; (3) where
such use is maintained in connection with a conforming building.) 45
This ordinance provided for a five-year elimination period for nonconform-
ing uses, but it was careful not to go so far as to eliminate nonconforming
buildings. The ordinance's constitutionality was approved in its particular
application to Gage. He was forced to discontinue his wholesale plumbing
business in a residential district, but the cost to him was small. His office
had been a conforming house; he had no other structures involved in his
business. The cost of relocating his business less than a mile away was
$1,000, or less than 1% of his minimum gross business for the five years.
Thus his amortized loss was small as compared to the public gain.
But the decision in Livingston Rock Co. v. City of Los Angeles48
went much further towards eliminating uses by amortization. There the
court approved a statute providing for an amortized elimination of a large
nonconforming cement batching plant. To prevent an unreasonably harsh
effect, the statute provided for a twenty year amortization period. Not
content with this boldness, the statute went further, and provided for a
shortening of the amortization period if the:
". .. (Regional Planning) Commission finds: (a) That the condition of
the improvements, if any, on the property are such that to require the prop-
erty to be used only for those uses permitted in the zone whence it is located
would not impair the constitutional rights of any person; (b) That the
nature of the improvements are such that they can be altered so as to be
used in uniformity with the uses permitted in the zone in which such prop-
erty is located without impairing the constitutional rights of any person ....
After a public hearing therein, provided, . . . the use for which the ap-
proval was granted is so exercised as to be detrimental to the public health
or safety, or so as to be a nuisance. '47
Thus in the one ordinance a two pronged attack on nonconforming uses
was provided for: (1) the certain elimination of nonconforming struc-
tures involving large private investments through amortization; (2) the
shortening of the amortization period if the nonconforming structure
became a public nuisance, this latter decision to be made by a Regional
Planning Commission. The provision for adjustments by the Commission
was designed to maintain a fair balance between the public welfare and the
interests of the individual. If the excepted business did little harm to
the conforming users of that zone at the time of the ordinance's adoption,
a reasonable period for discontinuing its operation would be allowed. But
as the community grew and this nonconforming use began to endanger the
larger public need for community planning, the commission could elimi-
nate the use.
4 5 Id. at 448, 274 P.2d at 37.
4643 Cal.2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954).
4 7 Id. at 124, 272 P.2d at 7.
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This statute in California's largest city indicates this state's progress
in developing adequate zoni#ng measures to satisfy the urgent need for
community planning. No longer does effective zoning involve the un-
solvable dilemma of police power against private property rights.
Eminent Domain as a Supplement to Police Power
Zoning ordinances represent the most effective device for the elimina-
tion of nonconforming uses. They effect future community planning and,
with some limitations, erase the blight suffered by communities who saw
the need for comprehensive planning too late. But zoning cannot remove
the vacated, antiquated office building or factory, or find new homes for
the crowded tenement dwellers. The likelihood is small that private capital
will enter such unattractive areas, go to the prohibitive expense of razing
such old structures, and then replace them with modern conforming struc-
tures. In such circumstances the only solution remaining is the use of
another form of government aid, eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the power of the state to take private property for
public use.18 The traditional requirement of this public use is that it be for
a substantial use by the public. This use has included the taking of private
property with reasonable compensation granted to property owners for the
construction of public highways, hospitals, schools, and forts,49 and in
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia" it was expanded to include a use "for
the public interest," as contrasted to use "by the public."
California followed this view in Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes.5'
There the court upheld the validity of the California Health and Welfare
Code provision that provided for a rehabilitation agency to clear slums and
blight areas:
Blighted Areas: Unfit buildings and structures, used or intended to be used
for living, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, or any combination of
such uses, which are unfit or unsafe to occupy for such purposes and are
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile
delinquency, and crime because of any one or a combination of the follow-
ing factors:
(a) Defective design and character of physical construction.
(b) Faulty interior arrangement and exterior spacing.
(c) High density of population and overcrowding.
(d) Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open spaces,
and recreation facilities.
(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, dilapidation, mixed character, or
shifting of uses.52
4 8 BLAcx, LAW DicnoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
49 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953).
50 Ibid.
51 122 CalApp.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954).
52 CAL. HEALTH & WELPARE CODE § 33041.
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The court also approved the reselling of the cleared areas to private per-
sons, provided: (1) that the proposed disposition of the title could rea-
sonably be expected to prevent the otherwise probable development of a
slum, (2) that the seizure of the title be necessary to the elimination of the
slums.
In Linggi v. Garavotti,3 the California Supreme Court followed the
same helpful attitude it had practiced in regard to zoning legislation. In
situations where the use to be made of condemned property was of a
doubtful nature, the will of the legislature prevailed over the doubts of
the court.
Only time can show with certainty the value of this new utilization of
eminent domain. There are some serious objections to its wide use. The
purchase of nonconforming structures is an expensive means of eliminating
them. A suitable system for reasonably compensating the owner and dispos-
ing of his land for maximum public benefit is difficult. These problems
were sufficiently difficult to discourage the use of eminent domain pro-
ceedings for the elimination of nonconforming uses until very recently.
Such proceedings will probably be confined to situations where other police
power methods are ineffective. But the very fact that eminent domain
is the only supplement to zoning ordinances thus far devised is reason
to believe that its help may be relied on to a greater extent in the future.
Conclusion
The danger posed to California's political, economic, and social de-
velopment by the nonconforming use is justification for a progressive
exercise of police power. This power is executed through: (1) judicial
presumptions, (2) abatement of public nuisances, per se and at law,
through proceedings in law courts and quasi-judicial agencies, (3) zoning
regulations within specified districts to forbid future uses of certain types,
limit expansion and/or amortize present nonconforming uses, and (4)
supplementary aid through eminent domain proceedings in limited situa-
tions where the use of other police powers is inadequate. The future use
of these instrumentalities of police power should be limited or expanded
as needed to preserve the just balance between the rights of the individual
and the public under the United States Constitution.
5 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955).
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